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Mackinnon: Negligence of Municipal Employees: Redefining the Scope of Police

NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES:
RE-DEFINING THE SCOPE OF POLICE LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION

A young boy bicycling home from school was suddenly accosted by a
strange man who dragged him into an abandoned house.' Other children
witnessed the attack and raced to phone the police. The dispatcher told the
children he would send help immediately and reported the call to the only
2
officer on duty, the police chief. Because their call remained unanswered,
the children went directly to the police station and met an officer arriving on
duty. The officer proceeded to the abandoned house where he found the ab3
ducted child in the house nude, the victim of a sexual attack.
A layperson whose perception of the legal system is shaped by notions of
simple justice might assume the police chief bears some liability4 for failing to
respond immediately to an obviously dangerous situation. Depending on the
jurisdiction,5 however, police may have an arsenal of potential immunities
that often result in a complaint's dismissal at the pleading stage.6 These
immunities range from the generally abandoned but still existent concept of

1. This incident occurred in Doe v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1979).
2. The police chief, after receiving the call, continued a conference with an out-of-state
sheriff investigating a grain theft. Id. at 500, 590 P.2d at 649.
3. Id.
4. Whether the municipal officer and the state are jointly or severally liable in cases of
officer misfeasance or nonfeasance is beyond the scope of this note. Liability of the state and
its officers is generally coextensive. Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1965). See also Jaffe, Suits Against Governments
and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. REv. 209 (1963).
For an argument that the rule should be exclusive governmental liability or governmental
liability with indemnification, see Berman, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort
Liability, 77 COLTM. L. REV. 1175 (1977).
In Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court construed the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), to include municipalities as possible defendants in
cases of municipal officer negligence. The Court rejected a theory of liability based on respondeat superior. Liability must be based on official policy or custom that causes the
injury. Id. at 691.
5. The degree of officer immunity may vary from one jurisdiction to another, but the
principles underlying immunity are the same throughout the country. State and federal courts
often rely on the rationale for immunity employed by other states or districts. See, e.g., Doe v.
Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 501, 590 P.2d 647, 650 (Ct. App. 1979) (court cites cases from
Connecticut, Arizona, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Florida, and California for authority that
the police chief owed the child no duty of protection).
6. If one has no duty to protect another, he cannot be the proximate cause of the other's
harm and cannot be liable. IV. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 42 (4th ed. 1971).
Cases involving alleged municipal officer negligence are generally before the court on appeal
from dismissal for failure to state a claim or from summary judgment for the municipality.
The facts alleged by the plaintiff are therefore considered by the court in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
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sovereign immunity7 to the more modern defense based on the public duty
doctrine.
The public duty doctrine asserts that when municipal services such as police
protection are established for the general public providers of these services owe
no duty to a particular individual. 8 All courts find an exception to the public
duty doctrine when individuals can prove a special relationship between themselves and the police.9 Because police have only a general duty of public protection, 0 the abducted child could prove no special relationship. The court
thus held the public duty doctrine precludes police liability and the case was
dismissed.1
The public duty doctrine has been attacked as unfair,' 2 unwise," antithetical
to traditional tort goals of loss-spreading and victim compensation, 4 and a
resurrection of sovereign immunity in disguise. 5 Nevertheless, until recently,
the doctrine has prevailed in most states. 86 In 1982, however, the Arizona Su7. In 1978, 36 states and the District of Columbia were reported to have waived sovereign
immunity. Spence, Abolition of Sovereign Immunity: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52

FLA. B.J. 655, 659 n.61 (1978).
8. For discussion of the public duty defense to municipal immunity, see generally 2 COOLEY
ON ToRTs § 3001 (4th ed. 1932); E. MCQUILLAN, Tim LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
§ 53.04(b) (3d rev. ed. Supp. 1981) (citing cases).
9. The precise circumstances that suffice to create a relationship between plaintiff and
police are unclear. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
10. "As a general rule, no civil liability arises for the failure of a city to supply general
police protection." Walters v. Hampton, 14 Wash. App. 548, 552, 543 P.2d 648, 652 (1975).
Accord Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. 3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975); Simpson's Food
Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871 (1971); Florence v. Goldberg,
44 N.Y.2d 189, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583, 375 N.E2d 763 (1978).
11. Doe v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1979).
12. "The time has come to remove from our law all the remaining vestiges of governmental immunity. . . .We should cut through the wilderness of special instances and
say . . . that municipal nonliability for injury-causing breaches of duty is archaic and
unjust." Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 141, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 599-600, 204
N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ct. App. 1965) (Desmond, J., dissenting).
13. "[D]emocracy by its very definition implies responsibility. . . .In this day of increasing power wielded by governmental officials, absolute immunity for nonjudicial, nonlegislative officials is outmoded and even dangerous." Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons &
Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265, 564 P.2d 1227, 1233 (1977) (en banc) (members of State Board of
Pardons & Paroles owe duty to individual members of general public of avoiding grossly
negligent release of highly dangerous prisoner).
14. "No longer is individual 'blameworthiness' the acid test of liability; the principle of
equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the cost of official misconduct." Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
15. "[W]e consider that the 'duty to all, duty to no one' doctrine is really a form of
sovereign immunity ...." Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976). For further
criticism of the public duty doctrine, see Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310
So. 2d 19 (1st D.C.A.), cert. dismissed, 839 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1976); Estate of Tansijevich v.
City of Hammond, 178 Ind. App. 669, 383 N.E.2d 1081 (1978); Riss v. City of New York, 22

N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting); Campbell v.
City of Belleview, 85 Wash. 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1978). See also Note, Municipal Tort Liability
for Failure to Provide Adequate Police Protection in New York State, 39 ALBANY L. REv.
599 (1975); Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARv. L. REV.

821 (1980).
16. The following four states recently rejected the public duty doctrine: Alaska in 1976,
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preme Court signaled the doctrine's decline by rejecting it when pled as a
17
defense to negligence by a state officer.
This note first discusses the traditional barriers to police liability. Particular attention will be directed to the public duty doctrine, the policy considerations supporting it, and its special relationship exception. The cases rejecting
the doctrine are then analyzed with special emphasis on the Arizona Supreme
Court decision. Finally, this note proposes to replace the public duty doctrine
with a new standard of police liability based on gross negligence.18
TRADITIONAL BARRIERS TO POLICE LIABILITY

Generally, the tort victim is compensated for his loss by the one causing
his injury.1 9 If the tortfeasor was a policeman, however, the plaintiff was traditionally without a defendant. The doctrine of sovereign immunity acted
as a barrier to imposing liability on the state or its agents.

20

Sovereign Immunity
2l

Sovereign immunity originated as an English common law device to
protect the King.22 In this country, the doctrine immunized not only the
federal government but also states and municipalities.2 3 Municipalities derived
Wisconsin in 1976, Oregon in 1979, and Iowa in 1979. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying
text.
17. Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 3013, 656 P.2d 597 (1982).
18. Though this note discusses the application of the public duty doctrine to alleged
negligence by police, the doctrine provides immunity for negligence by all types of municipal
and state employees and services. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gallatin County, 418 F.2d 96 (7th Cir.
1969) (custody of prisoners); Duran v. Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973) (fire
inspection); Rose v. Mackie, 22 Mich. App. 463, 177 N.W.2d 633 (1970) (highway maintenance);
Christensen v. Epley, 36 Or. App. 535, 585 P.2d 416 (1978) (custody of prisoners); Ryan v.
State Dep't of Transp.,
R.I.
420 A.2d 841 (1980) (motor vehicle licensing);
Baerlein v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 229, 595 P.2d 930 (1979) (en banc) (security act policing).
See also Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB.
303 (1977); Note, Municipal Liability for Negligent Building Inspections -Demise of the
Public Duty Doctrine?, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1416 (1980); Note, Municipal Liability for Negligent
Inspection, 23 Loy. L. REV. 458 (1977).
19. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 4. The law of torts recognizes when "a certain type of
loss is the more or less inevitable by-product of a desirable but dangerous form of activity it

may well be just to distribute such losses among all the beneficiaries of the activity ....
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 768 (1956).
20. According to Justice Holmes, "[a] sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law upon which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
21. So much has been written on the law of sovereign immunity, this note will present
only a synopsis of the aspects of sovereign immunity relevant to this topic. For more exhaustive
histories of sovereign immunity, see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage

Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial
Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu. 15 STAN. L. REV. 163 (1963). See also Professor Borchard's
seminal history Governmental Responsibility in Tort: 1-VII, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924); 36
YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926); 28 COLUM. L. REv. 577, 735 (1928).
22.

See Jaffe, supra note 21, at 210.

23.

The idea "[tihe King can do no wrong" was reinterpreted by Justice Jackson to
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immunity from the state only when acting as the state's political subdivisions
25
4
and performing governmental functions2 such as police protection.
Although all states embraced sovereign immunity, some courts and commentators criticized the doctrine's effect on the federal system. 26 These critics
considered the doctrine contrary both to constitutional guarantees of a legal
remedy for a wrong27 and to tort principles that liability follows fault.28 To
limit the scope of sovereign immunity, courts subdivided normally immune
governmental functions into acts that were discretionary or ministerial. 29
Discretionary acts involved the formulation of basic policy and were immune. 0
Ministerial acts implementing those policies were not immune. 31 For example,
the decision to use policemen as school crossing guards rather than for another
purpose is a discretionary action and thus immune from liability. A ministerial
act, such as failing to replace a guard known to be absent from a busy crossing,
is vulnerable to suit.
mean "the King can do only little wrongs." Dalebite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 60 (1953).
See generally E. McQuH.AN, supranote 8, § 53.02.
24. Municipalities were regarded as having a unique dual character as both corporate
and governmental entities. See Hagerman v. Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.2d 1152 (1937).
[fludicial decisions of this country have, with practical unanimity, declared and upheld
the doctrine that municipalities are not liable for the negligence of their officers and
employees when engaged in the performance of governmental or public duties, but
are liable for their negligence when performing duties consequent upon the exercise,
by the municipality, of its corporate or private powers.
Id. at 696, 66 P.2d at 1153. See also Krantz v. City of Hutchinson, 165 Kan. 449, 196 P.2d 227
(1948); W. PRossmt, supra note 6, § 131.
25. "The duty of the police to preserve a community's well-being is said to be owed to
the public at large.... The rule is sometimes justified on the somewhat murky distinction
between proprietary and governmental functions; police work falls within the latter category."
Porter v. City of Urbana, 88 Ill. App. 3d 443, 445, 410 N.E.2d 610, 612 (1980). See also Gillot
v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 507 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 1981); Keane v.
City of Chicago, 98 Ill. 460, 240 N.EX.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1968).
26. See, e.g., Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also W.
PROSSER,

supra note 6, § 131.

27. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 2d 697 (1922); Board of
Comm'rs v. Public Belt R. Comm'n, 71 So. 2d 590 (La. Ct. App. 1954).
28. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959);
Merrill v. Manchester, 114 N.H. 722, 332 A.2d 378 (1975); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562,
261 A.2d 896 (1970).
29. The leading Supreme Court case to interpret the distinction between discretionary
and ministerial acts is Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See also Commercial
Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 342 So. 2d 1047 (3d D.CA.), aff'd, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.
1979).
30. For one example of a "discretionary" act, see Robertson v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 358,
644 P.2d 458 (1982). Summoned by homeowner to remove drunk trespasser, police ordered
homeowner to leave instead of trespasser. Subsequently, the trespasser burned the house
down. The court declared the officer's order "discretionary" and thus not subject to liability.
Id. at 364-65, 644 P.2d at 462.
31. Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S2d 583 (1978).
Liability in Florence was also predicated on evidence that the child's mother relied on the
existence of a guard on duty. Otherwise she might have accompanied her child to school and
prevented his death when he was struck at an unattended crossing. Id. at 197, 375 N.E.2d at
767, 404 N.YS.2d at 587.
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Congress waived sovereign immunity in federal causes of action with the
Federal Tort Claims Act. 32 This Act makes the federal government subject to

the same liabilities as similarly situated private defendants. Although waiving
federal immunity, Congress retained the discretionary act exemption from
liability.

3

Following Congress' lead, states have generally elected to retain this

distinction.3 4 Thus, states that waive sovereign immunity nonetheless retain a
discretionary act exemption for municipal officers.35
Municipal officers perform even routine matters with some discretion.36
Consequently, determining which acts are policy decisions and which implement policy is a choice that continues to confound the courts.3 7 Lacking a
clearly defined approach, the courts immunize governmental functions which
either serve the public interest or are necessary to maintain the government's
integrity. 38 Many courts have sustained police departments' broad decisionmaking power as in the public's best interest 9
PublicDuty Doctrine
The discretionary act exemption from liability permits a state to retain
the desirable aspects of sovereign immunity while rejecting the overall doctrine.
Other barriers similarly preserve vestiges of traditional immunity for municipal officers. For example, some legislatures expressly exempt police from
liability for failure to provide adequate protection, 40 while others establish
32. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). See also Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81 (1968).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 26.80(a) (1976).
34. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-904(1) (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(b) (Burns
Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3(a) (West 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(1) (2d
Replacement Vol. 1978).
35. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
36. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) (en banc).
37. Some writers have therefore advocated adopting a simpler test to determine whether
an officer acted with due care in performing his duties. See generally Gray, Private Wrongs
of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303 (1959); Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official
Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEo. L.J. 889 (1965).
The discretionary act exemption nevertheless prevails in most states, see supra note 16
and accompanying text, although courts have tended to narrow the scope of the discretionary
act exemption. See, e.g., Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1975); Griffin v.
United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1062-63 (3d Cir. 1974); Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481
F.2d 585, 598 (5th Cir. 1973). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 132.
38. Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 311, 656 P.2d 597, 600 (1982). See also Shore v. Town
of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 151, 444 A.2d 1379, 1384 (1982) ("[tlhe adoption of a rule of
liability where some kind of harm may happen to someone would cramp the exercise of
official discretion beyond the limits desirable in our society . . .").
39. "We do not think the public interest is served by allowing a jury of laymen with the
benefit of 20/20 handsight to second guess the exercise of a policeman's discretionary professional duty." Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 151, 444 A.2d 1379, 1384 (1982).
But see Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977) (en
banc) (public officials are not afforded absolute immunity in performance of their discretionary functions). On the need for standards to control police discretion and a proposed model,
see Williams, Police Discretion: The Institutional Dilemma-Who Is In Charge?, 68 IowA L.
REv. 431 (1983).
40. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 818.2, 845, 846 (West 1980); ILL. RV. STAT., ch. 85,
§§ 4-102, -107 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:5-4, -5 (West Supp. 1980-81).
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limits on liability.41 The most pervasive device, however, is the public duty
doctrine42 which exempts police from liability to an individual for breach
of a duty owed to the general public.4 Because police have a general duty of
public protection, 44 no liability follows a breach of that duty to an individual.
The effect of the public duty doctrine is apparent in Riss v. City of New
York. 4 5 A young woman had complained to police for months about violent
threats by her former fiance. She reported an attack was imminent but was
denied police protection. The next day a thug hired by her fiance threw acid
in her face, maiming her permanently.- Applying the public duty doctrine,
the court ruled the police owed no duty to Riss individually. 47 In dissent,
Judge Keating characterized the holding as preposterous4 8 and expressed the
dilemma that confronts courts applying the public duty doctrine: to declare
no duty exists is to begin with the conclusion. The question is whether there
should be liability when police negligently fail to provide adequate police
protection. 49
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING
THE PUBLIC DuTY DOCTRINE

Most courts have answered the question raised by Judge Keating in the
negative for public policy reasons. ° Judicial reluctance to impose liability for
police negligence stems from the following concerns: courts lack the expertise
to evaluate police conduct; 51 judicially imposed liability would amount to a

41. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 8592-102 (1975); MINN. STAT. § 466.04 (1980); MONT. REV.
ANN. §§ 82-4332 to -4334 (1977 Supp.); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.270 (1977).
42. The public duty doctrine was first articulated in South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 396 (1856). "The sheriff, as conservator of the public peace is not liable to the
plaintiff... for an injury to the person or property of an individual from a riotous assembly
or mob . . . even if it should appear that [he] unreasonably omitted or neglected to exert
his authority to suppress it." Id. at 400.
43. For cases where police have asserted the public duty doctrine as a defense to
negligence, see Henderson v. City of St. Petersburg, 247 So. 2d 23 (2d D.C.A.), cert. denied,
250 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1971); Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 387, 272
N.E.2d 871 (1971); Doe v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1979); Drake v.
State, 97 Misc. 2d 1015, 416 N.YS.2d 734 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1979).
44. See supra note 10.
45. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 293 N.Y.S.2d 890, 240 N.E.2d 860 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 581, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 900, 240 N.E.2d at 862.
47. Id. at 580, 293 N.Y.S2d at 899, 240 N.E.2d at 861.
48. Id. at 581, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 900, 240 N.E2d at 862.
49. Id.
50. "Governmental units cannot be held 'absolutely liable' for any and all acts or omissions
which might cause damage or injury to private citizens. We will not impose upon government the obligation to guarantee and assure the health, wealth and happiness of every living
person." Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. 387, 394, 272 N.E.2d 871,
875-76 (Ct. App. 1971) (emphasis omitted). See also Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d
1, 3 (D.C. 1981) (the government is under no obligation to provide police protection to any
particular citizen).
51. See Jaffe, supranote 21, at 235-36.
CODF
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usurpation of legislative prerogative;52 and potentially crippling judgments
could result in abandoning or curtailing essential governmental services.5 3
JudicialLack of Authority
Several courts believe judicial evaluation of police conduct runs afoul of
separation of powers requirements.54 Local government decisions which affect
large groups of people involve a delicate balancing of conflicting interests. 5
Respecting this balance, some courts prohibit tort suits against municipal
officers to avoid inappropriately substituting judicial judgment for that of the
legislature. 56
This concern is arguably not applicable in police negligence cases. The
widely prevailing discretionary act exemption independently assures immunity
for a police department's basic policy decisions.57 Under this exemption, the
issue to reach the court is not whether a police department made the best
choice among competing interests, but only whether the act undertaken was
performed in a reasonable way.58
Judicial determinations of the reasonableness of police behavior present
no danger of substituted judgment when police ignore their own internal
operating procedures. For example, in the case of the absent school crossing
guard,5 9 police internal rules required the school to be notified when police
knew of a guard's absence.60 Because police failed to follow this procedure, the
school made no alternative provision for the children's safety. 6' Many cases in
which municipalities plead the public duty doctrine as a defense involve allegations of failure to follow internal operating procedures. 62 The results of these
52. "Any wider judicial review, we believe, would place the court in the unseemly
position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch
of government." Johnson v. State. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240,
248 (1968).
53. The imposition of liability "would impose an undue burden upon municipal corporations and might in fact substantially interfere with the licensing and investigatory functions
of such ... corporations." Gerneth v. City of Detroit, 465 F.2d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
54. See, e.g., Drake v. State, 97 Misc. 2d 1015, 1017, 416 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (Ct. CI. 1979)
("courts should not review policy decisions of coordinate branches of government concerning
the availability and allocation of limited police resources"), aff'd sub nom., Madigan v. State,
73 A.D.2d 1031, 425 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1980).
55. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648 (1980).
56. See, e.g., Drake v. State, 97 Misc. 2d 1015, 1019, 416 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (Ct. Cl. 1979),
aff'd sub nom., Madigan v. State, 73 A.D.2d 1031, 425 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1980).
57. See supra notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text.
58. Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 148 (5th Cir. 1981). For example, in Florence v.
Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978), see supra note 31 and
accompanying text, the issue before the court was not whether police acted wisely in electing
to place guards at schools. Rather, the court asked whether police were negligent in not
sending a replacement, given their knowledge of the guard's absence and the parent's
reliance on the guard's presence. 44 N.Y.2d at 193, 375 N.E.2d at 767, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
59. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
60. Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 193, 375 N.E.2d 763, 767, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583, 587
(1978).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure to discipline abusive
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cases are mixed. 3 Nevertheless, it is difficult to characterize as judicial overreaching the courts' requirement that police adhere to their own standards
of performance.
Judicial Usurpationof Power
Those supporting the public duty doctrine often also assert that judicial
64
abandonment of the doctrine would usurp a legislative prerogative. This
5
argument is a corollary to the previous argument but is applied to another
branch to raise the same separation of powers concerns. It ignores the doctrine's
judicial origins66 and fails to offer a reason why judicially created immunities
cannot be judicially dismantled.
7
Moreover, the majority of states have waived sovereign immunity. Consequently, the liability of the state and its officers has become coextensive with
that of a private litigant similarly situated. Some courts note that judicial
acceptance of the public duty defense revitalizes the same artificial distinctions
68
that legislatures abolished by waiving sovereign immunity. Judicial usurpation of legislative power thus arguably occurs when the court sustains the
public duty doctrine, not when it abandons it.
The CripplingJudgment
Municipalities have argued that abandoning the public duty doctrine
would expose them to a flood of litigation69 and require them to curtail or even
foreclose essential services.70 Because governmental decisions require balancing
officer whose behavior -was known to chief); DeLong v. Erie County, 89 A.D.2d 376, 455
N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (failure to follow procedures for verifying emergency
calls to 911 system); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 451, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct.
1978) (failure to enforce order of protection).
63. In Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19 (1st D.CA.),
cert. dismissed, 339 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1976), police 'who failed to follow requisite procedure and
report numerous reports of child abuse to protective service workers were liable when children
suffered serious and permanent injury from long term abuse. In Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F.
Supp. 602 (W.D. Mo. 1982), the court ruled contrariwise that procedures for handling reports of child abuse were created only for protection of the public, not individual children.
64. See, e.g., Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. 387, 390, 272 NE.2d
871, 875 (Ct. App. 1971).
65. See supra notes 54-63.
66. See supra note 25.
67. "Where there is no immunity, the state is to be treated like a private litigant.'
Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 242 (Alaska 1976). See also Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian
River County, 342 So. 2d 1047, aff'd, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
68. Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979). See also K. DAvis,
ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw TREATISE (1958). "[W]hen a court construes away such an unequivocal
statutory provision (abandoning sovereign immunity), the judicial responsibility for governmental irresponsibility is very grave indeed." Id. § 25.06, at 458-59.
69. See, e.g., Stigler v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. 2d 20, 26, 268 N.E.2d 26, 29 (1971): "If the
failure of the city [to enforce an ordinance] should render it liable for injuries sustained
thereby, the tremendous exposure to liability would certainly dissuade the city from enacting
ordinances designed for the protection and welfare of the general public .. "
70. Gerneth v. City of Detroit, 465 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109

(1973).
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of competing interests, inevitably some citizens will be adversely affected.
Some courts have consequently predicted that threatened liability could discourage municipalities from providing essential services. 71 Unpersuaded by
this prediction, other courts have noted that similar exaggerated arguments
were advanced to maintain immunity for schools, hospitals, and charities.
These organizations have nevertheless continued to function despite the
denial of immunity.72 Although liability may result in increased costs for an
organization's services, these courts consider the costs more properly borne by
all service users rather than by the single hapless victim of the organization's
3
maladministration7
Municipalities argue the crippling judgment is a second dire consequence
of abandoning the public duty doctrine74 According to this view, the negative
impact on the public fisc is immeasurable and inevitable, and could conceivably bankrupt municipal budgets.75 Rejecting this contention, many courts
suggest cities spread their risks by using the same means as those used by the
private sector. Insuring against loss is not prohibitively expensive76 and can
be viewed as a necessary cost of delivering municipal services. 7 In addition, a
state can levy additional taxes, sell bonds, increase tolls, or establish a tort
claims fund as a means of spreading losses. 7 8 Courts rejecting the crippling

71. E.g., Expeditions Unlimited Enters. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (en banc); Gerneth v. City of Detroit, 465 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1109 (1973); Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Stigler v. City of
Chicago, 48 Ill. 2d 20, 268 N.E.2d 26 (1971). But see Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ.,
453 Pa. 584, 597, 305 A.2d 877, 883 (1973): "[W]hile interesting and enlightening, [such arguments are] wholly irrelevant to the issue before us ..
"
72. Thompson v. City of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728 (1980)
(en banc); Merrill v. City of Manchester, 114 N.H. 722, 332 A.2d 378, 381 (1974).
73. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping, 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973).
74. See, e.g., Jones v. Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1109 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied sub nom.,
Dufrene v. Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1069, 1100 (La. 1977).
75. Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19 (Ist D.C.A.), cert. dismissed, 339 So. 2d 632, 636 (Fla. 1976) (Boyd, J., dissenting).
76. One writer noted that from 1963-1973 California maintained an effective insurance
plan after waiving sovereign immunity for $1,198,000 per year, including administrative costs.
When Hawaii waived sovereign immunity, it received claims totaling only $120,453.90 for
the year 1972. Note, An Insurance Program to Effectuate Waiver of Sovereign Tort Immunity,
26 U. FLA. L. REV. 89, 90-91 (1973).
Florida's experience with claims presented against the state since the 1969 waiver of
sovereign immunity has been different. Incurred costs for claims losses from 1973-1983 have
totaled $92,753,844. Costs to administer claim losses raised the total to $126,780,214 for the 10
years. This total represents a low in 1973-74 of $5,766,621 and a high in 1978-79 of $16,151,216.
Since 1978-79, total costs have declined each year with costs for fiscal year 1982-83 totaling
$10,929,240. Letter from Franklin D. Peters, Div. of Risk Management, Dept. of Insurance and
Treasurer, Florida, to Cynthia Mackinnon, September 20, 1983, on file with University of
Florida Law Review.
77. Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 403, 591 P.2d 719, 723 (1979).
78. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1248, 429 S.W.2d 45, 49 (1968). Some states have
statutorily provided for such loss spreading. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 975 (West 1980)
(authorizing the selling of bonds to finance the payment of outstanding tort judgments); id.
§ 970.6 (authorizing payments to a claimant under a structured settlement plan).
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judgment argument note that foreseeability and proximate cause principles
keep liability within reasonable limits.""
Courts rejecting the public duty doctrine perhaps err in summarily dismissing fears of burdensome judgments. An increasing number of suits for
larger amounts of damages are presently filed against governmental agencies.8 0
In response to the hazards of crippling judgments, however, courts need not reinstitute former immunities or preserve the public duty doctrine. Instead, a
standard for liability should be narrowly tailored to safeguard municipalities'
budgets.
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
TO THE PUBLIC

DuTy DoCaRuNE

Despite criticisms levied against the public duty doctrine, few courts have
rejected the doctrine. Instead, they have created a wide exception that
drastically limits its application. By finding that a special relationship exists
between the plaintiff and the police, courts avoid the rule that public duties
are not owed to a particular individual., The special relationship exception
79. E.g., Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982); Riss v. City of New
York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 581, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900, 240 N.E.2d 860, 863 (1968). A number of
commentators also discount the prediction that crippling financial burdens inevitably follow
liability. See, e.g., David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to Immunity From
Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1959); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered:
The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Lambert, Tort Law, 26 ATLA

L.J. 20 (1976).
Some writers argue imposition of municipal liability would have a salutory effect. See
generally Carrington, Deterrence,Death and the Victims of Crime: A Common Sense Approach,
35 VAN. L. REv. 587 (1982); Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM.
J.L. 9- Soc. PRoBs. 303 (1977). Instead of bankrupting municipalities and curtailing services,
imposing liability would increase the municipal officers' incentive to act more efficiently and
effectively. See, e.g., Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 148 (5th Cir. 1981); Grimm v.
Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 266, 564 P.2d 1227, 1233 (1977) (en banc).
80. For example, after a former junior high school teacher's aide entered a classroom last
May and held students and a teacher hostage all day, parents of some of the students immediately filed suit. Damages in excess of $8.5 million are claimed by parents of five students.
Delving into Deep Pockets, Tim, June 13, 1983, at 54.
A jury awarded an M.I.T. student $10.3 million after she alleged her apartment owner,
its security firm and M.I.T. were negligent in allowing her boyfriend in to her apartment
where he threw acid in her face. Lawsuits are increasingly aimed at well-insured third parties
rather than the attackers. Id.
Relatives of a woman murdered by her husband, a county commission chairman, have
filed suit against the county sheriff and a deputy claiming their negligence caused the
woman's death. After the commissioner threatened his wife with a gun, he was taken to the
sheriff's headquarters for observation. Because of his position as chairman of the county
commission, the sheriff released him after a short detainment. The commissioner then
borrowed a sheriff's gun, located his wife, and shot her five times. The claim against the
sheriff and deputy is apparently for $4 million. The Orlando Sentinel, May 12, 1983, § C, at
1, col. 2.
81. "[I]f the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the
public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a
public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of
public prosecution. On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a
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thereby permits recovery in the appropriate case, while generally preserving
the public duty doctrine.
Defining precisely the circumstances that create the appropriate case is
problematic, particularly because little uniformity exists among court des
cisions.8 2 Some courts require absolute privity between police and victim, 3
whereas others indicate "some relationship" between these parties suffices to
create a duty.8 4 Generally, foreseeability of harm or the victim's reliance creates
a police duty, 5 but courts differ as to whether either factor or both is required.86 Moreover, courts have applied the special relationship exception to
similar facts, yet reached opposite results.1 7 Thus, so long as the special reneglect to perform it . . . is an individual wrong ....
The failure of a public officer
to perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong only when some person
can show that in the public duty was involved also a duty to himself as an individual,
and that he has suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its nonperformance.
COOLEY ON TORTS, supra note 8, §§ 300, 385-86. See also E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 8, § 53.04b.
82. Courts have found general duties narrowed by a special relationship to informers.
See, e.g., Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147,
later app., 128 Ill. App.2d 157, 262 N.E.2d 829 (1970) (failure to protect a witness who identified
a suspect whom police knew had a violent temper and propensity for violence), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 919 (1971); persons under court orders of protection, see, e.g., Sorchetti v. City of
New York, 95 Misc. 451, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (failure to enforce court order
against man who threatened to harm his child); school children, see, e.g., Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583, 375 N.E.2d 763 (1978) (failure to protect children for
whom police voluntarily assumed duty). But see Henderson v. City of St. Petersburg, 247
So. 2d 23 (2d D.C.A.) (plaintiff who contacted police and arranged for protection while
making deliveries in dangerous part of city stated no claim when officers failed to meet him
at his destination and he was shot), cert. denied, 250 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1971); Hartzler v. City
of San Jose, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6 (Ct. App. 1975) (woman who had received
assistance from police on 20 previous occasions for protection from abusive husband had no
special relationship with police and was owed no duty when, calling for assistance the 21st
time, police declined to come and he killed her).
83. See, e.g., City of Tampa v. Davis, 226 So. 2d 450, 454 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969).
84. See, e.g., Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 139, 204 N.E.2d 635, 637, 256
N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (1965).
85. In establishing a requirement of foreseeability or reliance courts merely apply
ordinary principles of tort law to the special relationship exception. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 430-461 (1965). One court has criticized the special relationship exception on
these grounds as misleading. "It is somewhat unfortunate that the terms . . . have been
used inasmuch as they give the misleading impression that the distinction applies only to
governmental tortfeasors." Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1979).
86. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. In Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 120 Cal. Rptr.
5, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6 (Ct. App. 1975), the decedent was certainly a foreseeable victim but the
court found no evidence she relied on police protection.
87. Compare Frye v. Clark County, 97 Nev. 632, 637 P.2d 1215 (1981) (no special relationship created between fire department and victim where fire department in response to
emergency call miscopied victim's address) with DeLong v. Erie County, 89 A.D.2d 376, 455
N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (special relationship created between police and burglary
victim where police miscopied victim's address and victim was subsequently murdered).
But see Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981). Two women heard their
roommate being raped in the downstairs bedroom. They called police, were promised immediate assistance and crawled out on the roof to wait. Within minutes four police cars arrived.
Several rode around the house, one officer knocked on the door and receiving no answer, they
all left. The women crawled back inside, called the police again and were promised immedi2
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lationship exception is applied on an ad hoc basis, the scope of a police

officer's duty remains undefined.
R.EJECTION OF THE PUBLIC

DUTY

DOCTanE

In 1976, the unanimous state acceptance of the public duty doctrine began

to erode. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected the doctrine by characterizing it
as another form of sovereign immunity.88 In waiving sovereign immunity, the
Alaska Legislature elected to treat municipal officers in the same manner as
private litigants similarly situated.89 Absent sovereign immunity, the court
held the public duty/special duty distinction was no longer relevant.90
The highest courts of Wisconsin, Oregon and Iowa agreed with the Alaska
Supreme Court's determination that duties should not be imposed on the

basis of artificial distinctions between specially and generally owed duties.91
Because all three states had likewise waived sovereign immunity, 2 such artificial
distinctions contradicted legislative intent.93 These courts concluded the

proper approach to municipal employee negligence involves applying conventional tort principles of duty, breach and causation and finding a duty only
where policy considerations so require.94 Even where a duty exists, the trial
ate assistance. Believing the police were in the house, they called out to their roommate.
Hearing the two women upstairs, the intruders forced them downstairs and assaulted all three
women for 14 hours. The police never arrived. The court dismissed the claim for negligent
failure to provide adequate police protection. Although the police went to the premises, the
court found no special relationship between the police and the callers. A strong dissent stated
"[w]hen a police department employee tells frantic callers that help is on the way, it is
reasonably foreseeable that the persons so assured may forego, to their detriment, other
avenues of help. Once the police embarked upon services under circumstances where it was
reasonably foreseeable that a citizen might rely on their performance, they assume a duty
to perform with due care." Id. at 12.
88. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 285, 241 (Alaska 1976).
89. Id. at 242.
90. Id. The Florida Supreme Court, while not expressly abandoning the public duty
doctrine, has likewise acknowledged the irrelevance of such a distinction once a state has
waived sovereign immunity. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d
1010 (Fla. 1979). "[Mt is clear that the Modlin doctrine [general duty/special relationship
dichotomy] is a function of municipal sovereign immunity and not a traditional negligence
concept which has meaning apart from the governmental setting. Accordingly, its efficacy
is dependant on the continuing vitality of the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id. at 1015.
91. See Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 407, 591 P.2d 719, 725 (1979); Wilson v.
Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 668-69 (Iowa 1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 526, 528,
247 N.W.2d 182, 185 (1976).
92. In Alaska, Iowa and Oregon, the legislature had waived sovereign immunity. In Wisconsin, judicial waiver of sovereign immunity was codified by statute after the Coffey decision.
WIsC. STAT. § 898.80 (1983). See also Ar.AsKA STAT. § 09.50.250

(1988); IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 613A.2 (West Supp. 1988-84); OR. REV. STAT. 30.265(1) (1975).
98. See, e.g., Brennen v. City of Eugene, 74 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979). The Brennen
court further noted that the legislature had already considered the risks of municipal liability
and decided those risks could be better managed by placing limits on recovery rather than
retaining absolute immunity for state agents. Id. at 404, 591 P.2d at 728.
94. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d at 241; Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d at 669; Brennen
v. City of Eugene, 258 Or. at 407, 591 P.2d at 725; Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526,

541, 247 N.W.2d 182, 138 (1976). The Coffey court rejected cases cited by the city which relied
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court may determine that policy considerations should foreclose liability in a
specific case. Consequently, the public duty doctrine is unavailable in these
states to dismiss plaintiff's claim at the pleading stage or to grant a municipal
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 95
The decisions of the Alaska, Wisconsin, Oregon, and Iowa supreme courts
were rendered in the context of municipal licensing and safety inspections. 9"
In Ryan v. State,97 the Arizona Supreme Court extended the abrogation of the
public duty doctrine to cases involving allegations of the state's negligent failure
to prevent crime. 98 More significantly, in abandoning the public duty doctrine,
the supreme court overruled Massengill v. Yuma County which had previously
upheld the doctrine in Arizona. 99 Fourteen other states had relied on Massengill
as authority for the public duty doctrine.1°0 The Ryan court's rejection of
Massengill may therefore prompt the doctrine's reevaluation in several
jurisdictions.
In Ryan, the plaintiff was shot by a juvenile offender who had escaped
from state custody. The plaintiff alleged that the juvenile escaped from state
on a public versus a private duty to absolve the city of liability. Instead, the court elected to
define duty in terms of ordinary tort principles. "The concept of duty in Wisconsin, as it
relates to negligence cases is inexorably interwoven with foreseeability. Foreseeability is a
fundamental element of negligence." Id. at 537, 247 N.W.2d at 138. The Brennen court relied
on Prosser's definition of duty as being "an expression of . . . those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." Id. at 401, 591
P.2d at 719. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 5.3, at 331.
95. The Adams, Brennen and Wilson courts reversed the lower courts' judgment for the
state on the pleadings. 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); 282
N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979). The Coffey court affirmed the lower court's finding that plaintiff's
claims were not demurrable on grounds that the municipal officer owed only a general duty
and no special duty of protection. 74 Wis. 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132, 141 (1976).
The Alaska Supreme Court also rejected the discretionary/ministerial characterization of
municipal acts. Instead of applying this mechanical test which could also foreclose a claim
before trial, the Alaska court opted for weighing the policy considerations behind any labeling. Adams, 555 P.2d at 243.
96. See supra note 18.
97. 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982).
98. The plaintiff sued the state, the State Director of the Department of Corrections and
the Director of the Youth Center from which the juvenile escaped. 134 Ariz. at 308, 656 P.2d
at 597.
99. 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969). Before ruling, the Ryan court requested additional
memoranda and oral argument on whether Arizona should abandon Massengill and if so what
limitation should be imposed on governmental immunity. Id. at 309, 656 P.2d at 598.
100. See, e.g., Connecticut: Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379
(1982); District of Columbia: Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981); Illinois:
Porter v. City of Urbana, 88 I1l. App. 3d 443, 410 N.E.2d 610 (App. Ct. 1980); Indiana: Crouch
v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Kansas: Robertson v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan.
358, 644 P.2d 458 (1982); Louisiana: Dufrene v. Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1097 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 343 So. 2d 1069 (La. 1977); Michigan: Walkowski v. Macomb County Sheriff, 64 Mich.
App. 460, 236 N.W.2d 576 (1975); Minnesota: Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d
801 (Minn. 1979); Nevada: Frye v. Clarke County, 97 Nev. 632, 637 P.2d 1215 (1981); New
Mexico: Doe v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1979); Oregon: Brennen v.
City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Utah: Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17,
484 P.2d 160 (1971); Washington: Baerlein v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 229, 595 P.2d 930 (1979);
Wisconsin: Walker v. Bignell, 100 Wis. 2d 256, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981).
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custody because of grossly negligent supervision.' The trial court granted the
state's motion for summary judgment reasoning that the state had no specific
duty to protect the plaintiff1O2 The supreme court reversed and expressly rejected the public duty doctrine as a defense to public officers' negligence. 03 The parameters of the state's duty were held to be coextensive with
that owed by a private litigant. 0 4
Characterizing the prior distinction between discretionary and ministerial
acts as a "semantic legerdemain,"' 05 the Ryan court promulgated new guidelines for establishing a municipal officer's duty. Moreover, the court refused
to determine the presence or absence of a duty at the pleading stage or as
grounds for summary judgment. Instead, the court opted for the same case-bycase consideration of policy adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court.01 6 Immunity for municipal officers would be granted only when imposing liability
would thwart the operation of critical governmental functions or conffict with
07
established public policy.'
The Ryan court discounted certain public policy considerations invoked by
past courts to justify the public duty doctrine. Liability for officer misfeasance
did not hinder governmental operations 08s Additionally, statutorily required
municipal insurance weakened the state's predictions of crushing financial
burdens. 0 9 Finally, the court pointed out the significant limitation on liability
provided by the analytic framework of negligence law.110 For example, establishing causation is a significant burden for plaintiffs claiming harm from a
third person whom police allegedly failed to control.' The Ryan court, how101. At the time of the incident, the 17-year-old robber, Myers, had been sentenced to
incarceration for 2,252 days between his l1th and 17th birthdays. Sentencing was for offenses
ranging from armed robbery to stabbing his brother. During the incarceration period, Myers
had escaped for 551 days. The escape preceding the robbery occurred while Myers was playing
touch football in an unsecured recreational field adjacent to the detention center. Myers escaped in a car parked adjacent to the field with the keys left in it so the inmates could
listen to the radio while playing. Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 327, 328, 656 P.2d 616, 616-17 (Ct.
App. 1982).
102. Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 308-09, 656 P.2d 597, 597 (1982).
103. Id. at 311, 656 P.2d at 600.
104. Id. at 311, 656 P.2d at 599.
105. Id. at 310, 656 P.2d at 599.
106. See supranote 95.
107. Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 311, 656 P.2d at 600.
108. Id. at 310, 656 P.2d at 598. The court was not persuaded that situations would
change in cases of officer nonfeasance. Id.
109. Id. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
110. Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 310, 656 P.2d at 599.
111. Id. One court has granted summary judgment in favor of the state because causation
was too attenuated. See Walters v. Hampton, 14 Wash. App. 548, 543 P.2d 648 (1975). Causation has been viewed by other courts as sufficiently remote. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277 (1980) (death of woman murdered by parolee was too remote a consequence of parole
board's decision to release dangerous sex offender to hold board responsible). See also Evers v.
Westerberg, 38 A.D.2d 751, 329 N.Y.S2d 615 (App. Div. 1972), aff'd mer., 32 N.Y.2d 684, 296
N.E.2d 257, 343 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1973). But see Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 455, 176
N.Y.S.2d 302, 151 N.E.2d 862 (Ct. App. 1958) (whether policemen's negligence in placing
drunk fellow officer in cab was proximate cause of driver's injury when drunk officer shot
cab driver was a question for the jury). See generally Carrington, supra note 79 at 603-04
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ever, rejected this causation obstacle as grounds for summary judgment or dismissal.112 While the issues of duty, breach, and causation should not be resolved against plaintiff pretrial, the court recognized their resolution at trial
would provide an important and reasonable restraint on unfettered municipal
liability.
TOWARD A NEW STANDARD OF POLICE LIABILITY

The Ryan decision removed a substantial barrier for courts seeking to define the scope of municipal officer liability. When the complaint alleges
negligent police failure to prevent a crime, courts may reject the public duty
doctrine as a defense. A duty of general police protection may be owed individually even without a special relationship between the victim and the
police. Once a duty is established, however, courts must balance competing
interests to determine the standard of care that should follow from the duty.
The Interests to be Weighed
State statutes or constitutions usually describe a municipality's duty of
public protection in general terms, leaving specific methods for implementing
these duties to state and municipal officials.113 Chief Justice Burger has stated
that no public officials are granted such wide discretion over matters affecting
all people as are the police.,4 Unlike the legislature which can be voted out
of office and the judiciary which can be overruled, police officers exercise their
discretion without adequate safeguards to prevent errant decisions.115 Many
courts and commentators believe society's best interests are served when public
officers are held accountable for their misconduct116 Without the shield of the
public duty doctrine, courts may more readily expose police misconduct and
official maladministration, thereby serving the public's interest in overseeing
discretionary conduct. On the other hand, a proposed standard for police
liability must balance society's need to oversee abuse of administrative discretion against police work's inherently risky and stressful nature. 1 7 Society

(discussing the theoretical problem of proving causation in actions alleging harm from a third
person authorities failed to control).
112. Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 311, 656 P.2d at 599.
113. See, e.g., FLA. CONsr. art. VIII, § 2(b).
114. Williams, supra note 39, at 434 (quoting Chief Justice Burger's address to the FBI
National Academy Commencement).
115. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 266, 564 P.2d 1227, 1233
(1977) (en banc).
116. See generally Williams, supra note 39. See also Carrington, supra note 79.
117. Many experts consider police work to be the most stressful occupation. See Daviss,
Burnout: No One Can Imagine What the Costs Are, 5 POLICE MAG. 9 (1982) (study of
effects of police burnout); Fell, Richard & Wallace, Psychological Job Stress and the Police
Officer, 8 J. OF POL. SCI. & ADM. 139 (1980) (study indicates relatively high rate of police
officers develop serious disorders appearing to be stress related); Reiser, Action and Reaction:
The Establishment of Counseling Services in Chicago Police Department, 43 THE POLICE CHIEF
20 (1976) (establishing a counseling service to cope with occupational stresses of police work).
John Gardner describes the alienation produced by police work:
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has allocated to police the difficult and stressful function of maintaining public
order. This obligation sometimes entails instantaneous decisions with life and
death implications. Police may be charged with false arrest if they act too
quickly and dereliction of duty if they fail to act quickly enough. 1 ,
The Responsive Standard:GrossNegligence
State courts should follow the lead of both the Attorney General's Task
Force on Violent Crime and the federal courts and apply a gross negligence
standard to define the scope of police liability. The Task Force recently proposed a gross negligence standard in suits alleging that federal agencies failed
to imprison or supervise dangerous persons or failed to warn foreseeable
victims of dangerous persons."19 A gross negligence standard would encourage
20
more efficient administration of federal agencies.1
Federal courts have also adopted a gross negligence standard for civil rights
claims . 2 The courts believed that a simple negligence standard was overinclusive since it could cover inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness. 2 2 An overinclusive standard of liability could impede the good faith performance of
inherently risky work. 2s A rule of culpability only for gross negligence, however, strikes a balance between the need to avoid impeding the provision of
an essential public service' 24 and the desire to compensate victims of officials'
wrongdoing."'5
Mhe policeman is lucky if he does not eventually (however subtly) go mad. It begins
in disengagement. It is not the man but the uniform that makes arrests, takes the
insults or the fawning, or (most of all) the averted faces, the stares that pass through
him. Like a man in a hypnotic trance, he moves not by his own power but by a
force of a thing outside himself, his badge ....
Standing with his foot on the bumper
of a reckless driver's car, writing down the license, he no more writes himself than the
hypnotist's subject raises the arm he has been hold to raise: it is the Law that writes.
J. GARDNER, THE SUNLIGHT DrALOGuEs 219, 221 (1972).
118. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
119. U.S. DEP'T oF JuSnCa , ATroRNEY GPNERAL'S TAsK FoRcE ON VIoLNHT CRIME: FINAL
RmORT, recommendation 63 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
120. "[A]ccountability would act as an incentive for professional and efficient administration and would tend to act as a deterrent to grossly negligent actions...." Id., recommendation 63, commentary.
121. Following Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), plaintiffs
may sue a municipality or its officers for negligence under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). To state a cause of action under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege they were
deprived of a federal right by defendants acting under color of state law. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 171 (1961). Plaintiffs may also assert pendant state or common law claims of
negligence. Some plaintiffs assert only a federal claim, perhaps perceiving federal courts as
more receptive to claims of municipal or state negligence than state courts. Federal courts
have rejected a simple negligence standard in § 1983 causes of action. E.g., Hays v. Jefferson
County, 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982); Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976);
Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
122. Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1979).
123. Id.
124. If liability is imposed only for gross negligence, no essential services are impeded.
Acts that are grossly negligent partake of no legitimate public purpose. Bonner v. Coughlin,
545 F. Supp. 565, 576 (7th Cir. 1976) (Swiggert, J., dissenting).
125. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 119, recommendation 63, commentary.
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged a good faith effort defense to gross
negligence. 1

6

One measure of good faith effort is compliance with required

procedures, regulations, and longstanding practice. 12 7 This defense would
thus be unavailable in police negligence cases where a police officer carelessly
disregarded prescribed operating procedures.lss Accordingly, the case would proceed to trial on the merits because plaintiff would have stated a claim and the
12 9
defendant would receive no summary judgment.
The importance of compliance with internal procedures as a defense to
gross negligence has one theoretical hazard. This approach could conceivably
induce departments to eschew formulating official performance standards
against which conduct could be measured, and thus encourage action on an
ad hoc basis. In actuality, however, there is a widespread movement among
police departments to develop operating manuals as a defense against charges
of ad hoc decisionmaking3 0 Furthermore, even when a given department lacks
official standards, courts could look to the rules of other police departments
for guidance.13'
Allowing compliance with clear and comprehensive internal procedures
to operate as a defense could have only a salutory effect. An enlightened selfinterest would lead departments with such standards to review them and departments without such standards to develop them. 13 2 In either case both the
department's efficient operation and the public's well-being would be better
served.

126. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978).
127. Id. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Plaintiffs alleging police negligence have often alleged failure by police to follow their
own internal procedures. The success of these claims has previously been barred by the public
duty doctrine. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
Any standards of required police conduct must be specific enough to avoid charges of unconstitutional vagueness. See generally Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1974);
Perea v. Fales, 39 Cal. App. 3d 939, 942, 114 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1974). Moreover, departments should develop some administrative means to discipline officers whose conduct falls
short of required standards but which is not legally actionable. Williams, Police Discretion:
The Institutional Dilemma - Who Is In Charge?, 68 IOwA L. REv. 431, 480 (1983).
129. Imposing a gross negligence standard would require statutory amendment in many
states. State legislatures often indemnify the acts of state agents except in cases where their
conduct is grossly negligent. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 111.07 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 6-903(b), (c)
(Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.07(l)(2) (West 1977). This unfortunately leaves the
hapless plaintiff without adequate redress when he needs it most. "It is where the officer's
offense is enormous that indemnity is likely to be denied; and such cases may be....
ones
where the injury is greatest and the officer judgment proof." Jaffe, supra note 8, at 217.
130. See, e.g., Kutzke, The Department Manual: An Organizational Necessity, 47 TIIF
PouicF CHIEF 46 (1980).

131. Bonsignore v. City of New York, 521 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (police department procedures for detecting officer's psychological disability were inadequate when compared to those of other smaller cities and department was liable to wife of mentally unstable officer who shot her before committing suicide).
132. Proponents of victims' advocacy programs claim one objective is to provide incentive for administrative agencies and law enforcement to improve their operating procedures. See generally Carrington, supra note 79.
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CONCLUSION

A new standard of police liability would not necessarily change the result
of the case involving the child molested in an abandoned house. Had the case
gone to trial, the police chief might have had defenses for his lack of timely response. The insulation of the public duty doctrine, however, obviated the
need for any explanation.
The best interests of society are not served when police behavior is shielded
from scrutiny. Police officers, like the public they serve, should have the opportunity to vindicate their actions at trial. To abolish the public duty doctrine
would provide opportunities for such vindication and increase public confidence in and awareness of police work.
Any standard that replaces the public duty doctrine must, however, consider the high risks inherent in police work 13 3 and the current trend of crime
victims to seek awards from public entities.1 4 To adopt a standard of liability
which permits recovery whenever police err in judgment would unduly restrict
the performance of a vital government function?35 Grossly negligent acts, however, need no protection because they further no public interest. 13 When such a
fundamental interest as the physical safety of citizens is at stake, no justification
exists for insulating the grossly negligent behavior of police from liability.
CYNTHIA ZELLNER MACKINNON

133. Police officers must "act swiftly and firmly at the risk that action deferred will be
futile or constitute virtual abdication of office." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246 (1974).

See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Thirty-four states have enacted some
type of crime victim compensation law. U.S. DEP'T OF JusrIcE, ArroRNEY GENERAL'S TASK
FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME: FINAL REPORT, recommendation 64, commentary (1981). See, e.g.,
FLA.STAT. § 960.20 (Supp. 1982); IoWA CODE ANN. § 907.12(2) (West 1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 1151(2) (1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.021 (Vernon Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-17-lA (pamphlet 1981). See generally Carrington, Victims' Rights Organizations:A Wave
of the Future, 11 U. Ric. L. REv. 447 (1977); Harland, Monetary Remedies for Victims of
Crime: Assuring the Role of the Criminal Courts, 50 U.C.LA. L. REv. 52 (1982).
135. See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 124.
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